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Introduction Government has mandated the institution of the Household Contracted Responsibility System ( HCRS) in China摧sextensive pasture areas , in part to prevent or arrest grassland degradation . Fencing is the measure taken to enforce household‐based property rights and increase grassland protection . However , our research has indicated that some areas in which propertyrights are clearly demarcated are still experiencing grassland degradation , yet some un‐fencing areas remain in good condition .This situation appears to contradict traditional economic analysis .
Materials and methods Our research takes the case of a natural village of １１ households of herders . The herders did noteliminate the ambiguities of the pastures with different property rights through fencing . However , their grasslands are well
protected , without grassland degradation or over‐stocking , and they have maintained economics of scale though jointoperations . Using the perspective of new institutional economics , we adopted analytical methods from anthropology , sociologyand institutional economics to understand the full transaction costs involved in different institutional arrangements , particularlyrecognizing the abilities of resources‐users to engage in self‐organization , community forms of operation and to apply indigenousknowledge and practices .
Results Absence of fencing did not automatically result in a�T ragedy of the Commons" situation . On the contrary , the assumedinefficiencies of collective action actually resulted in transaction cost savings under some conditions , and also remainedcompatible with the goal of protecting the grassland . The reason is because the herders living in the same area have stronghomogeneous characteristics due to their common history and culture . Therefore they can better understand the importance of
protecting the grassland and have a shared ecological knowledge of rangeland management . This can be demonstrated by twoobservations : firstly the social agreements between herders reduced the execution cost of certain actions ; secondly , theyachieved the goal of sustainable use of the grassland .
Conclusions Pastoral fencing in pursuit of clear property rights may not be the best institutional arrangement . It can be deducedfrom the study that the benefits derived from the pursuit of clear property rights over pasture are overestimated ; in fact , theopportunity costs of fencing are seriously neglected . Therefore , ignoring the regional diversity and complexity , neglecting thedifferent characteristics between the cropped land and the pasture , and mandatory implementation of the household contractresponsibility system in grassland areas will possibly lead to economic and ecological inefficiency .
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